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Abstract
This paper investigates the position of social-democratic parties (SDPs) towards antitrust (com-
petition) policy. Given their traditional state-interventionist attitude and their ties with organized
labour, SDPs have long been considered as not supportive of antitrust policy. However, antitrust
policy’s goal of granting consumers lower prices is beneficial to salary-earners. Hence, it is not
surprising that SDPs’ support for antitrust policy varies considerably. To account for such varia-
tion, this paper hypothesizes that SDPs’ support for antitrust policy depends on: a) the influence of
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trade unions; b) the electoral system; and c) the degree of coordination of the economy. Analysing
in depth 16 party manifestos of West European SDPs from 2002 to 2013, we check the plausi-
bility of our hypotheses with 7 paired comparisons. Our analysis supports the hypothesis that the
influence of trade unions affects SDPs’ support for antitrust policy, while the impact of electoral
system and economic coordination appears less evident.
Keywords: antitrust; competition; party manifestos; social democracy; trade unions.
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1 Introduction
This article investigates the variation in European social-democratic parties’ (‘SDPs’)
commitment to enforce antitrust rules. SDPs are defined as all centre-left parties with
an affiliation to the socialist international and/or the Party of European Socialists (see
Cramme and Diamond, 2012; Giddens, 1998). “Antitrust rules” are the European equiv-
alents of the Sherman, Clayton, and Federal Trade Commission Acts in the United States
– i.e. rules prohibiting anti-competitive practices such as cartels, abuses of dominant po-
sitions in the market, mergers and acquisitions that may lessen competition. These rules,
which are often seen as less intrusive than other forms of regulation, aim, among other
things, at curbing abusive market power exercised individually or collectively by under-
takings.
To gain an idea about the variation we investigate, contrast the British Labour Party’s
manifesto of 1997 with the Belgian Parti Socialiste’s manifesto of 2003. The former
proclaimed that “Competitiveness abroad must begin with competition at home”, and that
“[a]s an early priority we will reform Britain’s competition law [. . . ] we will adopt a tough
‘prohibitive’ approach to deter anti-competition practices and abuses of market power”.1
The latter declared that, “[a]gainst the market and its excesses, the PS wants to affirm
the authority of the state. [. . . ] Market regulation cannot possibly be limited to classical
antitrust regulation.”2 So, why do some SDPs use their electoral manifestos to promise
1 Similar pro-antitrust stances were adopted by the French Parti Socialiste in 2002, the Greek PASOK
in 2007, and the Portuguese Partido Socialista in 2005 and 2009.
2 Similarly sceptical stances can be found in the manifestos of the Italian Ulivo in 2006 (see also that of
the Italian Partito Democratico in 2013) and the French Parti Socialiste in 2007, both of which focus more
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robust antitrust enforcement, while others prefer emphasizing the limits of antitrust, the
necessity of “harder” regulation, or the need for industrial policies?
The question of whether SDPs should protect competitive markets or wait until the con-
tradictions of capitalism render nationalizations and/or regulation necessary is, of course,
as old as the debate between Kautsky and Bernstein (Sassoon, 1997). Yet it is also di-
rectly relevant to many current debates about the core values, the modernization, and the
future of social democracy (e.g. Giddens, 1998: 35, 47, and 149-50; Kay, 2012: 68;
Kenworthy, 2014: 104, 178; Powell, 2004; Sejersted, 2011). As most of these authors
note, until recently SDPs had been associated with “egalitarian and redistributive values”
(Powell, 2004: 6), and hence with planning, corporatism, and public spending (Giddens,
1998: 4; see also Boix 1998). Despite a few exceptions, they had never truly commit-
ted to the view that competitive markets yield the best possible allocation of resources,
and that competition must therefore be protected. No wonder scholars wrote books about
SDPs entitled “Politics against Markets” (Esping-Andersen, 1985) and “The Primacy of
Politics” (Berman, 2005). As John Kay put it, “The European centre-left has not been
very interested in the mechanics of markets” (Kay, 2012: 68). Although much of that
has now changed, it has only partly done so. Since the 1980s SDPs have sought to “aid
the market” (Thomson, 2000), often limiting themselves to proposing merely “light-touch
regulation” (Kay, 2012: 63). Some scholars have even argued that the Anglo-Saxon an-
titrust regulation is “not exportable to Continental Europe” (Powell, 2004: 4; see also
Meyer, 2007).
On the other hand, many theorists no longer perceive any contradiction between tradi-
on regulation and industrial policy than on antitrust.
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tional SDPs’ values and vigorous antitrust enforcement. According to a leading American
social democrat, for example, a reliable antitrust regime is fully compatible with the goals
of SDPs, because its aim is to avoid that “corporate behemoths” may “maintain market
share and profitability despite little innovation” (Kenworthy, 2014: 104–5; see also Sas-
soon, 1997: 250; Amato, 1997; Monti, 2001). Also, regarding the purported incompati-
bility between antitrust and social democracy, scholars note that the German ordo-liberal
tradition (Gerber, 1998) and the Scandinavian model (Kenworthy, 2014) have been able
to reconcile the state-market dichotomy, safeguarding both economic competition and
welfare state.
So, the literature is divided. However, if one sought to answer the question of whether
antitrust is compatible with social democracy by looking at what SDPs actually promise
in their manifestos, no straightforward answer would emerge. Even a cursory look at
national SDP programmes reveals great variation. Such variation is visible even among
parties whose countries are members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (‘OECD’), the European Union (‘EU’), and the European Economic Area
(‘EEA’). Within that group, noteworthy differences exist even among parties which are
members of the International Socialist and the Party of European Socialists. Further,
these differences do not seem to correspond either to differences in attitudes towards the
process of European integration or to developments in EU competition law. The empirical
puzzle we seek to address is thus the following: why do these parties, which are similar
in so many respects, differ so much in terms of their sponsoring of antitrust policy as a
solution to power-related market failures?3
3 We define cartels, monopolies and other types of dominant positions as “power-related market fail-
ures” in that they are self-defeating results of the market process which impede the working of the market,
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To answer that question we examine the plausibility of three different explanations which
are all derived from a common rational institutionalist framework. First, the strength of
the relations between the SDP and trade unions conditions the ability of party leaders to
appeal to small businesses, and hence their ability to commit to pro-small business an-
titrust. Second, the proportionality of the electoral system creates more or less strong
threats on a SDP’s ideological left, and hence affects the political attractiveness of the
policy. And third, the degree of coordination of the economy (i.e. the “variety of capital-
ism”) defines how compatible antitrust is with other institutions, and hence makes it more
or less politically attractive. Based on seven systematically selected comparisons and a
wealth of triangulated primary and secondary sources, we conclude that the null hypoth-
esis (a) can probably be rejected for the strength of trade union influence (i.e. the more
a party depends on trade union support, the less it will support vigorous antitrust regula-
tion); (b) might need to be considered in greater detail for the electoral system (i.e. SDPs
in more proportional systems might be less inclined to propose strong antitrust measures);
(c) can certainly not be rejected for the degree of coordination of the economy (i.e. the
“variety of capitalism” does not seem to affect SDPs’ positioning on antitrust).
These findings are relevant for at least three literatures. First, in comparative politics,
they contribute to our deeper understanding of the variable nature of social democracy,
including SDPs’ electoral strategies and the profound impact of globalization and post-
modernity on these parties. Whereas many interesting studies have explored the pos-
sibilities of social-democratic politics and policies in advanced industrial societies (e.g.
and which are due to the excessive market power that some undertakings or groups of undertakings might
acquire. They are different from other kinds of market failures such as public goods, negative externalities,
or limited information.
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Berman, 2006; Delwit, 2004; Kay, 2012; Kenworthy, 2014), none has done so by looking
at antitrust policy as an instrument in the electoral toolkit of these parties. Second, in
public policy in general, and the study of regulatory policies in particular, understand-
ing when SDPs endorse antitrust regulation offers privileged insights into the nature of
such ideologically ambivalent policies. Here the relevant debate is between those who
interpret all market-based supply-side policies such as antitrust as essentially non-social
democratic instruments (e.g. Esping-Andersen, 1985; Gerber, 1998; Meyer, 2007), and
those who admit that at least some versions of antitrust are compatible with the broader
ideological apparatus of social democracy (e.g. Amato, 1997; Crouch, 2012; Wigger and
Nölke, 2007; Wilks, 1999). Third, a number of scholars have argued that governing coali-
tions delegate powers to non-majoritarian institutions in order to lock-in policies against
future attacks by differently-minded governing coalitions (e.g. Moe, 1990; Gilardi, 2008;
Thatcher, 2005). This thesis seems to be confirmed by the delegation of extensive powers
by centre-right governments to independent antitrust regulators in such diverse countries
as Austria (2005, popular party), France (1986, Gaullist party), Germany (1957, centre-
right coalition), Greece (1977, popular party), Norway (2005, centre-right coalition), or
Sweden (2008, popular party). What remains to be seen, however, is whether SDPs truly
pose a uniform and permanent threat to antitrust policies.
Below, Section 2 introduces an informal model of antitrust preferences of SDPs and pro-
poses three main hypotheses. Section 3 offers some methodological comments regarding
the operationalization of our variables, our sources of information, the qualitative case
selection technique we follow, and the basis of our inferences. Section 4 presents our
comparative case studies. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Theory and hypotheses
Historically, most SDPs represented the interests of the working class, defined as the non-
asset owning segment of the population with a high propensity to spend. Accordingly,
SDPs focused more on interventions to modify market outcomes and redistribute wealth,
and less on hands-off, market-based mechanisms aimed at maximizing growth (Boix,
1998). Regarding structural microeconomic policies, nationalizations and/or hands-on
regulation (i.e. not antitrust) are the kinds of solutions that are widely perceived as offer-
ing the best fit with SDP ideology. According to a legal historian, the support of SDPs for
antitrust “has seldom been intense and committed [and] competition as a value does not
fit easily with the rhetoric of left-oriented parties” (Gerber, 1998: 425).
Yet that is not conclusive evidence of the supposed incompatibility of SDP politics and
antitrust ideology. Several SDP thinkers and politicians have been advocates of vigorous
antitrust enforcement (Amato, 1997; Kenworthy, 2014; Giddens, 1999; Van Miert, 2001).
As for parties, the British, French, German, and even Italian SDPs have often strongly
supported new antitrust legislation. In 1948, Clement Attlee’s Labour government passed
Britain’s first antitrust legislation. In 1989, the French socialist presidency of the EU did
not veto, and perhaps even actively backed the first Merger Regulation. Other examples
abound. Accordingly, in what follows we assume that vote-maximizing SDP leaders can
choose whether to propose (or not) antitrust policy. Their choice depends on the costs and
benefits of doing so.
Regarding the redistributive consequences of antitrust policy, consider a situation where
technological advances render economies of scale, transaction costs, and barriers to entry
increasingly important. Markets will concentrate, and cartels, tacit oligopolistic coordi-
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nation, long-term contracting, and monopoly power appear. Such a trend affects not only
the public at large, but also the more competitively-structured sectors of the economy.
If, as is most likely, private market power is not evenly distributed across nations, eco-
nomic sectors and firms, political turmoil may occur – as it did in the 1880s America,
or in the 1930s Germany. Further, the capture of the unevenly distributed monopolistic
rents by a portion of the labour force will create inequalities. Although some workers
(those employed in the relevant industries) will undoubtedly benefit, their gains will also
contribute positively to the social costs of private monopoly (Weiss 1966).4 Finally, in so
far as economic theory supports the view that increased competition at home is the best
means to achieve higher rates of innovation and/or international competitiveness, politi-
cians will have an incentive to protect and even foster domestic competition. Under these
circumstances, SDPs may consider antitrust regulation.
On the other hand, if private market power can indeed lead to supra-normal profits, and if
labour is organized, then the unions can capture a portion of monopolists’ rents – the fa-
mous “monopoly wages” (Weiss 1966). This renders antitrust a politically less attractive
option, particularly for parties which represent wage-earners.5 Indeed, monopoly wages
are not just typically higher than competitive wages: provided that labour is unionized,
they also bite into total employers’ surplus, often at a level of more than 50% (Karier
4 This result extends to all forms of private market power and not just unilateral monopoly; however, it
does not extend to all forms of public market power, since the portion of rents that is not captured by labour
is put to productive political use.
5 A preliminary assumption is that antitrust policy does not have the perverse effect of creating in-
centives for generous profit-sharing with unions in order to avoid antitrust detection under the profitability
test.
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1985). It follows that anti-competitive markets (a) penalize most workers only a little,
(b) benefit asset-owners to some extent, and (c) profit to a concentrated group of work-
ers a lot. In addition, relatively bigger firms facilitate labour unionism because their
workers face lower transaction costs at the moment of organizing and negotiating with
managers, and have lower turnover rates. Moreover, even some small businesses may
actually benefit from anti-competitive practices such as long-term contracting, accommo-
dating price-fixing, or market-sharing agreements. Overall, this concentration of benefits,
combined with the dispersal of costs, makes competition enforcement a politically risky
option, particularly for SDPs.
With this in mind, we propose a theory of the political economy of SDPs’ support for
antitrust policy which rests on five reasonable assumptions. First, as far as this paper is
concerned, policy options for the regulation of markets are essentially one-dimensional,
and they go from outright nationalizations to complete laissez-faire. Between the two
extremes, the choice that most SDPs face is that between the more interventionist ex ante
regulation of markets and the more liberal antitrust enforcement.
Second, socio-economic actors view antitrust as instrumental in bringing prices closer to
their competitive equilibrium level, and in improving the quality of goods and services.
Competition compresses profits, and hence wages. Conversely, rent-seeking monopolies
favour organized labour activities, and therefore consolidate the positive relationship be-
tween employer size and wages (e.g. Black and Strahan 2001, Brown and Medoff 1989).
Third, different socio-economic actors have different ideal points, which are common
knowledge. The preferences of socio-economic actors are single-peaked decreasing func-
tions of the distance between policy proposals and the agent’s ideal point. First, trade
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unions represent working-class interests, which include both high wages and low prices
(workers have comparatively low disposable incomes, and so prices affect them compara-
tively more). Yet, the mandate of trade unionists is biased in favour of job security, wages
increases, and improvements in working conditions. It does not include bringing prices to
their competitive level. Second, most small and medium-sized enterprises (‘SMEs’) and
non-politicized consumers support vigorous antitrust. Even though some SMEs may ben-
efit from restrictive price agreements, vertical price-fixing, and/or excessive monopolistic
prices, on average they seek the protection of static competition. Conversely, firms with
an important market share in a relevant product and geographic market on average benefit
more from the absence of antitrust (Bittlingmayer 1992, McChesney and Shughart 1996).
Finally, some SMEs and big capitalists favour industrial policy or laissez-faire.
Fourth, political parties tend to represent different socio-economic groups, but their pref-
erences over non-constitutive, non-salient policies such as antitrust are those of office-
seekers (vote-maximizers). Thus, SDPs’ objective utility functions are flat within some
distance around the ideal points of the groups they represent: within certain limits, their
preferences are not totally exogenous to the balance of power between neighbouring
socio-economic actors.6 Hence, within those limits, antitrust can be traded in exchange
for votes and/or contributions.
6 Communists prefer nationalizations and/or regulation; socialists prefer regulation and/or antitrust;
liberals prefer antitrust; conservatives prefer antitrust and/or laissez-faire; and the far-right prefers laissez-
faire and/or corporatism. Hence, the further away a political party is from the liberal “centre”, the less it is
likely to advocate a strong competition policy. For example, communist (state-monopolistic) and far-right
(laissez-faire corporatist) parties are less likely to support antitrust than SDPs and Christian conservatives,
who are in turn less likely to support antitrust than centrist parties. (Gerber 1998; for U.S. data, Gerring
1998)
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Fifth, SDPs’ leaders seek to maximize electoral support (votes and/or campaign contri-
butions which translate into votes). More specifically, SDPs represent predominantly
salaried workers, but these are not a majority of the electorate. Therefore, SDPs face a
trade-off: represent their core constituency by promoting particularistic policies (at the
cost of acquiring an electoral majority), or make concessions to ideologically neighbour-
ing constituencies (at the possible cost of alienating their core supporters) (Przeworski
1985). To sum up, antitrust is not constitutive of SDP identity: it is just not as central a
concern to SDPs’ core constituents as welfare, education, etc. In fact, most SDPs’ core
supporters should naturally favour slightly more heavy-handed regulation. But SDP lead-
ers seek to gain voters, either on their left or on their right. This means they may attempt
to use antitrust as a currency: they can promise more of it to centrist voters (SMEs), or
less of it to leftist voters (trade unions). The question is, when will the balance tilt one
way or the other?
In determining their electoral offer, SDP leaders consider the marginal rate of substitution
between centrist (liberal, pro-antitrust) support by SMEs, and leftist (statist, anti-antitrust)
support by trade unions. SDP leaders know that, if they promise vigorous antitrust en-
forcement, voters will interpret it as favouring lower prices, lower profits, and hence lower
wages. This will appeal to SMEs, but it will alienate trade unions. If, on the other hand,
SDP leaders promise permissive antitrust enforcement (e.g. direct regulation or even out-
right nationalizations), this will be interpreted as favouring higher prices, higher profits,
and therefore higher wages. This attracts trade unions, but also alienates SMEs.
Now consider the case where unions are strong – i.e. where the unionization and con-
centration rates are high. To gain enough SME support to compensate for even a slight
increase in competition (and hence a decline in financial, political, and moral support by
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trade unions), SDP leaders will have to promise policies close to the ideological centre.
This is a high-risk strategy, because centrist and centre-right parties will react to attract
their natural constituents (SMEs and consumers), thereby increasing these constituen-
cies’ elasticity of demand for SDP policies. Hence, in equilibrium, where unions are
strong, the SDP party leadership should not promise a lot on antitrust. Conversely, of
course, trade unions may be weak and split. Where that is the case, and therefore where
SMEs/consumers are relatively stronger, to compensate for even a slight loss of competi-
tion, the concessions the SDP leadership would need to make to trade unions would need
to be considerable. Hence, the party leadership will deem such a left turn non-worthwhile,
and will promise a vigorous antitrust policy. Following this analysis, the crucial question
becomes, what are the determinants of trade union power over the electoral strategy of an
SDP? We propose a three-fold answer:
Firstly, and rather obviously, trade unions are strong when they can exercise control over
the SDP leadership. Not only may the party rely on them for financial support, but they
may also have the institutional to write the electoral manifesto, or to elect the party lead-
ership and hold it accountable. A typical example of this would be the British Labour
Party in the 1980s. In such cases it will be very risky for the SDP leadership to attempt to
gain enough SME support to compensate for even a light increase in antitrust (and hence
a partial loss of trade union support) – and vice versa. Hence, our first hypothesis is that:
H1: The greater the influence of trade unions on an SDP, the less the party will promise
on antitrust policy.
Second, trade unions are strong when there exists a credible leftist political alternative
to the SDP. More specifically, the presence of an electorally strong communist, Green,
or “old-left” party offers the unions a comfortable fallback position should they fall out
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with the SDP leaders, and hence increases the elasticity of their demand for policies. For
example, where the electoral system and the distribution of voters’ preferences allow for
the presence of a potentially strong leftist party, trade unions will exhibit a very high
elasticity of demand for antitrust policy. A typical example might be Italy, where the
leadership of the Partito Democratico and its predecessors is sometimes constrained by
the ability of the unions to back a potentially powerful leftist opposition. In such cases, the
unions can desert the SDP faster than SMEs are able to join in support of it. Conversely,
where the leftist opposition does not seem a credible electoral threat, the threat of trade
unions will not be sub-game perfect, and therefore the SDP leadership will have more
leeway to sponsor antitrust policy. Our second hypothesis is:
H2: The strongest the (potential) electoral threat on the left, the less an SDP party will
promise on antitrust policy.
Third, trade unions are strong when the SDP leadership cannot easily champion policies
which increase the party’s appeal to the liberal centre. This is the case where the political
economy of the country is characterized by strong coordination institutions (Hall and
Soskice 2001). More analytically, economic policies usually exhibit a certain degree of
complementarity (Boyer and Saillard 2001). A proposal for a policy change in some
area must either be accompanied by a wider reformist agenda, or it will be perceived as
cheap talk. Accordingly, a SDP proposal to reinforce antitrust enforcement will be more
credible in a liberal than in a coordinated market economy – and vice versa. Therefore,
our third hypothesis states that:
H3: The more coordinated a national political economy, the less the SDP will be able to
credibly commit to more antitrust enforcement.
14
3 Methodological comments
We are aware that statistical testing may yield accurate and generalizable results in the
research on party manifestos. However, we find that existing databases of party mani-
festos do not properly distinguish between antitrust and other forms of regulation, and
therefore suffer from problems of measurement error. Manifesto Project Database code
403, for example, yields the same score for quasi-sentences on antitrust (e.g. “cartels
will be fined”) and for traditional (i.e. anti-competitive) regulation (e.g. “utilities’ prices
will be capped”). Further, simple quantifications miss reputational issues. It is one thing
to find that in 2005 the British Labour Party did not insist much on antitrust tout court,
and quite another to acknowledge that by that time the party had already (a) proposed
vigorous antitrust enforcement in 1997 and 2001; (b) passed the Competition Act 1998
and the Enterprise Act 2001; (c) worked towards convincing the sectoral regulators to
apply antitrust law; and (d) been at the forefront of EU competition law modernization.
Hence, having to choose between reliability and validity, we opt for the latter. We do so
by conducting a series of controlled qualitative comparisons, where cases are selected on
the basis of the variation of one independent variable at a time (King et al., 1994).
Regarding the use of electoral manifestos to derive the SDPs’ stance on antitrust policy,
we consider them as the most reliable and comparable source to gather information on the
parties’ policy formulation. We know that there can be relevant differences between what
parties promise and what they actually do. Yet the research on manifestos is an important
part of scientific studies on parties in general (see e.g. Budge et al. 2001, Klingemann
et al. 2007) and specifically on SDPs (e.g. Wolinetz 1993, Volkens 2004). Moreover,
considering different sources in our study would make the unit homogeneity assumption
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not tenable, and would make comparisons more arbitrary and difficult to interpret.
Regarding the operationalization of the variables, we take “union influence on an SDP”
to be a function of not only the formal institutional rules that regulate the union-party
relationship, but also of informal features which necessarily affect that relationship. For
example, in 2000 the British and the Danish trade unions had roughly equivalent formal
powers to influence their respective SDPs; yet Tony Blair’s media-based politics made
it so that the former had considerably less real influence than the latter. For Austria,
Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, and Sweden – the cases we knew less well
– we conducted two expert interviews per country. This yields the classification shown in
the first column of Table 1 below.
To take a few examples, in Denmark union density has always been high, at around 74%.7
Although 1995 marked the end of an era of very tight cooperation, the unions continued
to finance the party until 2003. In Ireland, union density in the last twenty years has been
around 45%, and the Irish Congress of Trade Unions has been separate from the Labour
Party since the 1930s. Nevertheless, the unions send delegates to the party’s conferences,
the election of the party’s leader is often organized in the unions’ headquarters, and the
Services Industrial Professional and Technical Union and the municipal employees divi-
sion of IMPACT trade unions, among others, are still affiliated to the party. In Germany,
where union density is traditionally lower (about 26% since 1990 on average) and where
there is a long history of collaboration between the SDP and the main unions, that rela-
tionship was severely damaged by Gerhard Schröder’s “Agenda 2010” and particularly
7 Average value in the period 1980-2009. All data on unionization in the paper are taken from Visser
(2011).
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the 2003 Hartz IV law on the reform of the labour market. At around 53%, Belgium is
a case of relatively high unionization; nevertheless, unions are split, and the one that is
historically and ideologically closer to the country’s two SDPs, FGTB/ABVV is only the
second one in size. In France, union density is at only 8% (though the unions are still
able to organize massive demonstrations), and most non-communist unions are jealous of
their independence from political parties. In addition, relations between the Jospin gov-
ernment and unions with some affinity to the SDP (FO and CFDT) reached a historical
low following the 2006 strikes against new employment contract for young workers.
Turning to the second independent variable, we only need to classify electoral systems
from most majoritarian to most proportional. To do so, we have collected information
from the ACE project at www.aceproject.org, and have cross-checked and interpreted that
information using chapter 13 of the second edition of Principles of Comparative Politics
(Roberts Clark et al. 2013). So, for example, the UK’s Single-Member Plurality System
places it at the majoritarian extreme, followed by France whose two-round majority runoff
system for the presidential elections and its two-round majority plurality system for the
ensuing general elections also create important anti-proportional effects. Austria’s and
Ireland’s Hare systems place them at the proportional end of the spectrum.
As regards the degree of coordination, we rely on the indices of coordination in corpo-
rate governance and coordination in labour market calculated by Guardiancich and Guidi
(2015), which are based on the same methodology used by Hall and Gingerich (2009).
The corporate governance index measures how much firm control in a country is in the
hands of common shareholders rather than held by a small number of them. The labour
market index measures the power of unions in wage bargaining and the degree of its cen-
tralization (at state- rather than firm-level). Since the authors’ data refer to the early 2000s,
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we integrated them with qualitative research for what concerns more recent years. So, for
example, we follow Guardiancich and Guidi (2015) in considering Greece between 2000
and 2011 as a very coordinated economy, but we place it among the most liberal ones in
the 2011-14 period, after the sovereign debt crisis and the subsequent surveillance of the
“Troika” (International Monetary Fund, European Central Bank, European Commission).
Similarly, we consider Germany as much less coordinated after the 2003 Hartz IV reform,
compared to the years before.
Influence of unions on
SDP (highest to lowest)
Electoral system (most
proportional to most
majoritarian)
Coordination of the
political economy
(strongest to weakest)
Denmark 2000-2003
Sweden
Norway
Austria 2000-2006
UK 2000-2003
UK 2011-2014
Ireland
Germany 2000-2003
Denmark 2003-2014
Austria 2006-2014
Belgium
UK 2004-2010
Germany 2003-2014
France 2012-2014
France 2000-2004
France 2005-2011
Spain
Greece
Portugal
Ireland
Austria
Norway
Sweden
Germany
Denmark
Belgium
Portugal
Spain
Greece
France
UK
Austria
Norway
Greece 2000-2011
Belgium
Spain
Sweden 2000-2006
Portugal 2000-2010
Germany 2000-2004
Denmark
Ireland
Portugal 2011-2014
Greece 2011-2014
Sweden 2007-2014
France
Germany 2004-2014
UK
Tab. 1: Countries or SDPs classified according to their score on the three independent
variables (2000-2014).
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As mentioned above, for the dependent variable we have avoided relying on premature
quantification, and have opted instead for a purely qualitative approach. Accordingly,
our operationalization focuses on the antitrust-related pronouncements of SDPs in their
respective electoral programs in a specific election year. Electoral programmes were read
from the beginning to the end, collecting all antitrust-related statements, including those
that might only appear in specialized chapters (e.g. chapters on environmental protection,
on agriculture, or on culture). To maximize validity, reliability, and communicability of
our measurements and findings we base our case studies on extensive quotes from these
texts, giving more weight to general (i.e. economy-wide) pronouncements and less weight
to sector-specific ones.
The result is Table 1, which forms the basis of our case selection. Each column lists
an independent variable, and a number of SDP electoral manifestos are ranked accord-
ing to their score on that variable. All cases listed in Table 1 share a certain number of
characteristics, which can therefore be deemed to be controlled for: advanced industrial
democracy status (e.g. membership of OECD); EU/EEA membership; and SDP with ex-
perience of government. We have also limited the population by only considering cases
between 2002 and 2013, thus controlling, among other things, for the secular decline of
communism and the development of European antitrust and merger case law. In select-
ing cases for comparison we have also tried to take parties from equally-sized countries,
thereby controlling for trade openness and thus the intensity of import-competition.
Finally, regarding our inferences, we rely on a combination of within-case assessment
and the more usual correlational logic. The most important rule at this stage has been to
examine the plausibility of different causal claims by privileging the null hypothesis. In
the conclusion we come back to the issue of possible omitted variable bias.
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4 Comparative case studies
This section presents seven comparative case studies. For presentational reasons, we pro-
ceed to test the plausibility of our three hypotheses in reverse order. Hence, the first two
comparisons assess the impact of the level of coordination of an economy; the third and
fourth, the impact of the electoral system; and the fifth, sixth and seventh, the influence
of trade unions.
Comparison 1: Norwegian AP 2005 and 2009 vs. Swedish SAP 2006 and
2010
These represent cases with roughly similar trade union influence (strong), near-identical
electoral systems (very proportional), but different degrees of coordination of political
economies (Norway more coordinated). H3 would be supported if the Swedish social-
democratic party (Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti, SAP) proposed more an-
titrust than the Norwegian labour party (Arbeiderpartiet, AP) did.
Starting with SAP, it is the oldest, biggest, and most successful political party in Swe-
den. Its policies have reflected the interests of its core constituencies, namely blue-collar
workers of umbrella trade union confederation Landsorganisationen i Sverige (LO), and
public employees. It has been in favour of high welfare spending, a coordinated economy,
and an important role for trade unions. After the loss of the 2006 general elections to the
centre-right Alliance, the SAP formed an ephemeral alliance with the Greens and the
Left. Despite the relaxation in the union/party links in 2003, some twenty national trade
unions and LO are still rather influential in the party – though the second-biggest union
20
confederation in Sweden (Tjänstemännens Centralorganisation) is not affiliated to any
party. Unlike its Danish sister union, which cut its links to the social-democrats in 1995,
the Swedish LO still supports SAP financially, runs the top-selling pro-SAP Aftonbladet
daily newspaper, and nominates a member in the executive committee of the party. The
party returns these favours by promoting the role of trade unions, including in its electoral
manifestos, where it supports their role in signing comprehensive collective agreements
and in managing globalization at the regional and global scales.
Turning to the value of the dependent variable, note preliminarily that Sweden is a coun-
try where all major modern antitrust laws have been passed under centre-right administra-
tions, first in 1993 and then in 2008. In addition, the history of antitrust enforcement, both
public and private, is rather short. To day only one cartel and one abuse-of-dominance
cases have ended in condemnations. Against that background, it may not be surprising
to find that, contrary to the centre-right Moderates, SAP did not make any promises in
favour of antitrust enforcement either in its 2006 or in its 2010 manifesto. Although the
absence of such promises in 2010 may seem to point to the influence of alliance with the
Greens and the Left, the fact that the party had similarly not supported antitrust in 2006
seems to point to a more structural explanation, namely the influence of trade unions.
Turning to the Norwegian AP, like SAP it has traditionally been the largest and most suc-
cessful party. Nevertheless, starting in the mid-1980s the party has entered a phase of
relative decline. As a remedy, successive party leaderships since Gro Harlem Brundtland
have adopted a more social-market economy profile, including promises for privatiza-
tions. In the end of the 1990s, AP finance minister and subsequently Prime Minister Jens
Stoltenberg became nationally famous as an advocate of Tony Blair’s New Labour ideol-
ogy and policies. Regarding the links between AP and LO, the two organizations were
21
formally separated in 1997. Nevertheless, a weekly committee still coordinates the two
leaderships’ activities, the head of LO is elected to the AP leadership, and unions still
finance the party. LO, which represents 21 national unions and counts more than 900,000
members, provides AP many of its star politicians – and vice versa (e.g. LO leaders
Gerd-Liv Valla and Yngve Hägensen have held senior positions in AP).
Turning to AP’s positioning on antitrust, it has been very similar to its Swedish counter-
part’s. Although the first modern antitrust legislation was passed in 1994 under an AP
administration, since the turn of the century the centre-right seems to have acquired a
monopoly over this policy. First, the new 2003/4 act was passed by the Bondevik admin-
istration. Second, the conservative Høyre party always calls in its manifestos for strong
antitrust enforcement – for example, in 2005 they stated that “Høyre believes that it is
the job of the government to facilitate competition through a strong competition law and
the liberalization of public sector-dominated markets. [. . . ] Høyre will prevent concen-
trations of power through appropriate legislation and strong and independent competition
supervision.” AP has never matched these proposals, insisting instead on the dangers of
competition in finance, postal markets, and the utilities. So, contrarily to what we ex-
pected from H3, there do not seem to be notable differences between the SDPs of the two
countries with respect to competition policy.
Comparison 2: Austrian SPÖ 2006, 2008, 2013 vs. Irish LP 2007
This comparison, too, aims at discovering the influence of the level of coordination of
a national political economy on a SDP’s ability to endorse antitrust policy. The cases
score rather similarly regarding trade union influence on the party (medium), have near-
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identical electoral systems (very proportional), but differ regarding the degree of coordi-
nation of their political economies. H3 would be supported if the Irish Labour Party (LP)
supported antitrust more than the Austrian social-democrats (Sozialdemokratische Partei
Österreichs, SPÖ) did.
SPÖ is the oldest and one of the most successful parties in Austrian politics, though it has
often had to rule in a grand coalition with the Christian democrats. Traditionally, it has
advocated moderate centre-left policies. During the Cold War, the party fully endorsed
Austria’s neutrality policy. In the early 1980s, it briefly tried relying exclusively on its
right wing (liberal) branch. Regarding its relationship with trade unions, it has to be noted
that Austria has a peculiar union movement, whereby the Austrian Trade Union Federa-
tion (Österreichische Gewerkschaftsbund, ÖGB) is the only union, and the only workers’
organization with the right to conduct collective bargaining. Thus, ÖGB represents more
than one ideologically coherent movement – in fact, it is known for having factions which
may support different political parties. Traditionally, of course, most ÖGB members and
factions have supported SPÖ, and the union has provided the party with several high-
ranking members. That close relationship was strengthened during the centre-right coali-
tion government of 1999-2006, but it has since been loosened again. Now ÖGB insists it
is non-partisan.
Regarding its positioning on antitrust, in 2006, 2008, and even 2013 SPÖ has always
supported vigorous enforcement by independent institutions. In 2006, it insisted on mak-
ing Europe more “social”, and it was critical of the EU’s predominantly liberal policies.
It nevertheless advocated the liberalization of energy markets, proposed a competitive
regime for the internet, and made a positive statement for antitrust. That policy became
even more explicit in 2008, when it maintained its criticism of overtly liberal European
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policies, but also proposed to strengthen Austria’s competition authority, and promised to
step up the fight against monopolies – even proposing that in abuse of dominance cases
the burden of proof lied with the accused. Finally, the 2013 manifesto reveals that SPÖ
pro-antitrust positioning was no accident. SPÖ still proposed to strengthen the antitrust
laws, increase the powers of the competition regulator, and act in energy markets.
Turning to Ireland in 2007, LP was never such a dominant force as AP, SAP, or even SPÖ,
but still had several years of experience in government. The election was fought under
the leadership of former eurocommunist politician Pat Rabbitte. Regarding unions/party
links, they can be deemed roughly similar as those between ÖGB and SPÖ in Austria:
although Labour and the Irish Congress of Trade Unions separated amicably in the 1930s,
their relationship continues to be rather close, with debates for the election of the Labour
leader often being held in union offices, and union delegates sent to Labour conferences.
On the other hand, not all unions are affiliated to the LP, and relations have not always
been smooth.
Regarding Labour’s positioning on antitrust in 2007, it was rather ambiguous. In his
forward to the manifesto Rabbitte did write that “it is the task of government to confront
the arbitrary interests and the concentrations of power which hold people back.” Similarly,
in the main text Labour did promise to “adequately resource the competition authority to
pursue rigorous competition enforcement”. These relatively vague statements, however,
are considerably shorter than the party’s detailed plans on more hands-on regulation. At
the very least, there is no evidence that LP was more pro-antitrust than was its Austrian
counterpart.
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Comparison 3: British Labour 2005 vs. German SPD 2009
This comparison examines the possible influence of the electoral system. These cases
represent parties in countries with similar degrees of political-economic coordination,
similar levels of union influence on the party, but different electoral systems. H2 would
be supported if British Labour proposed more antitrust than the German social-democrats’
(Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD) did.
Starting with the Labour Party, 2005 was the last election fought by (increasingly con-
troversial) Tony Blair. The party still received support by trade unions, and the Trade
Union & Labour Party Liaison Organisation produced the 2004 Warwick Agreement just
in time to allow the unions some influence on the party’s manifesto. On the other hand,
the widespread impression at the time was that Labour had become a middle-class, centre-
looking party which did not rely on the unions for electoral victory.
Regarding Labour’s positioning on antitrust, it declared that “competition is a driving
force for innovation [and] our competition regime has been toughened with independent
competition bodies and stronger penalties” and that “we will continue to work to protect
the rights of consumers”. That was a less enthusiastic endorsement of the policy than in
the very pro-antitrust manifestos of 1997 and 2001. Yet, the difference may be due more
to the achievement of the goals set in 1997 and 2001, rather than to the influence of trade
unions. In conformity with H2 we thus interpret Labour’s stance as pro-antitrust.
Turning to the SPD manifesto of 2009, it was written at a time when German trade unions
showed exceptionally low levels of active support for SPD. Indeed, following Chancellor
Gerhard Schröder’s 2003 liberalizing and deregulating plan “Agenda 2010”, many union-
ists felt increasingly alienated, and many of them helped create the leftist party Die Linke.
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In line with this progressive detachment, the United Services Union (Vereinte Dienstleis-
tungsgewerkschaft, VERDI) had taken over the traditionally pro-SPD metalworkers union
IG Metall as the biggest member of the German Trade Union Confederation. All in all,
the relationship between the unions and the party was roughly similar as that between the
British trade unions and the Labour party in 2005.
The SPD’s manifesto remained remarkably ambiguous on antitrust. On the one hand, it
did briefly declare that SPD was “in favour of competition and antitrust policy”, and it did
state it would pursue an antitrust policy protecting small and medium-sized enterprises.
On the other hand, it assured that fair competition should not be protected at the expense
of wages and working conditions, and that “a new phase of cooperation, rather than just
competition, must begin”. In coherence with that statement, the SPD promised to protect
services of general economic interest, to regulate financial and energy markets, and to
create “industrial policy opportunities”. In conformity with H2, we interpret this as less
pro-antitrust than the British Labour’s stance.
Comparison 4: French PS 2007 vs. German SPD 2009
This comparison, too, examines the role of the electoral system, since in 2007 France and
Germany were similarly liberal economies, and their SDPs were similarly distanced from
trade unions. Since we examined the case of the German SPD above, we only need to
present the French case here.
France is a country where most trade unions (except from former communist General
Confederation of Labour, CGT) have long been jealous of their independence from polit-
ical parties. Following decades of continuous decline, in 2007 unionization levels were
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at a mere 8%, though unions maintained the ability to organize massive demonstrations.
Despite some controversy over figures, the biggest union was CGT. In addition, since
the Jospin government, which was regarded as too moderate in its economic policies,
the PS had lost the active support of the unions, and even of its closest ally, the French
Democratic Confederation of Labour.
In contrast with H2, which predicts that SDPs in less proportional systems should face less
competition on the left and therefore be more in favour of antitrust enforcement, the PS
did not promise anything on this issue in its 2007 manifesto. On the contrary, it declared
that they “want to act like a real left-wing party . . . against the marketisation [sic] of
life” and against deregulation. It criticized EU competition policies in energy and water
markets, and proposed an antirust exemption for services of general economic interests.
Finally, the manifesto called for a new industrial policy.
Comparison 5: Norwegian AP 2005, 2009 vs. Austrian SPÖ 2006, 2008,
2013
This comparison examines the possible influence of trade unions. These cases repre-
sent parties in countries with similar degrees of political-economic coordination and very
similar electoral systems, but different levels of union influence on the party. H1 would
be supported if the Austrian SPÖ were more positive about antitrust than its Norwegian
counterpart. The information in Comparisons 1 and 2 lends support to that view.
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Comparison 6: German SPD 2002 vs. Spanish PSOE 2008
This comparison examines the possible influence of trade unions. H1 would be supported
if Spanish social democrats (Partido Socialista Obrero Español, PSOE) proposed more
antitrust than the SPD did – which it did.
First, in 2002 the German SPD had not yet alienated unions the way it did with Gerhard
Schröder’s controversial Agenda 2010 speech on March 14, 2003. Further, traditionally
pro-SPD union IG Metall was still Germany’s largest union, VERDI not having formed
yet. In its manifesto, the party backed structural reforms, and more competition in the rail
market, but promised nothing specific on antitrust. That relative silence might be due to
it having already passed new cutting-edge antitrust legislation in 1998. Nevertheless, the
fact that Schröder had spent much of 2001/02 criticizing the European Commission’s DG
COMPETITION for failing to consider the needs of German industry (Smith 2005: 189)
points to a purposeful decision to keep a decisively non-antitrust profile.
In Spain, like in France, non-communist unions do not maintain the kind of organic links
to SDPs that North European unions do. Despite the proximity between the General
Union of Workers and the socialist party, relations are generally seen as severely damaged
since the general strike of 1985 against the González administration. Combined with a
low unionization rate (16%), this allows PSOE more flexibility than the German SPD had
in 2002.
Regarding antitrust, PSOE’s 2008 manifesto was very detailed and very supportive of the
policy. Dedicating to it more than a page, it insisted on the compatibility of antitrust with
egalitarian policy goals. Although it advocated more hands-on regulation for the labour,
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housing, finance, energy, and telecommunication markets, it highlighted the beneficial
effects of vigorous antitrust enforcement in all other sectors. On the institutional side,
PSOE promised to ease private enforcement, including class actions, and to reinforce the
political and operational independence of the national competition authorities.
Comparison 7: Belgian PS 2003, 2007 vs. Greek PASOK 2004
Before 2009, Belgium and Greece were rather similar in terms of the degree of coordina-
tion of their political economies, and not too dissimilar in terms of their electoral system.
However, they differed regarding the influence of trade unions on their respective SDPs.
In Belgium, unionization was about 50%. The General Federation of Belgian Labour,
the second-largest trade union, maintained close relations with the socialist party (PS)
(though it also had regular contacts with the Greens). Above all, it was considered by the
PS as both a valuable electoral ally and a professional organization with valuable exper-
tise. In Greece, on the other hand, unionization has long remained below 25%. The two
biggest trade unions, the Civil Servants’ Confederation (ADEDY) and the General Con-
federation of Greek Workers (GSEE), have gone from a position of great subservience to
the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) in the 1980s and early 1990s to one where
the party did not seem to need their support in the 2000s.
In conformity with H1, in both 2003 and 2007 the Belgian PS run on a considerably less
pro-antitrust ticket than its Greek counterpart. For the PS, EU treaties must be amended to
insert a social-policy goal for all policies, including the internal market and antitrust, for
“market regulation cannot be limited to classical antitrust regulation”. At the institutional
level, “the state must guarantee the general interest [and] regulators must be autonomous
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and impartial but should not adopt policies which contradict those defined by the legiti-
mate political authorities.” In 2007, it noted that “even if competition has some positive
effects, it also has some limits”, which can be seen in the poor quality of utility provisions
in Sweden and the UK. These statements contrast sharply with those of the centre-right
Parti Réformateur, which took a decidedly pro-antitrust stance on both occasions.
As regards Greece, in 2004 PASOK promised to “adopt an effective regulatory framework
that secures competition and consumer protection”. After advocating the liberalization of
regulated markets – including the professions – it defended its record on pro-competition
privatizations, and promised a constitutional reform to create autonomous regulators, in-
cluding an antitrust authority. Finally, it announced it would work towards empowering
consumers’ associations in their role of guardians of competition. This, too, confirms H1.
5 Conclusions
Based on the careful examination of fifteen SDP electoral manifestos and seven system-
atic comparisons, we have qualitatively tested three hypotheses about the determinants
of SDPs’ support for antitrust policy (see Table 2). We found preliminary evidence in
support of our first hypothesis – namely, that a greater influence of trade unions on SDPs
results in less pro-antitrust positions. The ten cases which go into our three comparisons
on this dimension give preliminary support to the idea that the null hypothesis might be
rejectable. If that is so, then unions may still have a way to influence policy – provided
they are not evicted from the party.
Concerning H2, which hypothesized that a more proportional electoral system increases
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the chances of opposing antitrust policy, the evidence is more uncertain. Although one
controlled comparison lent strong support to H2, the other did not. Given the centrality of
this kind of institutional variables in the comparative politics literature (e.g. Chang et al.,
2010), we believe that this is certainly an area where more theorizing and more empirical
work are needed.
Hypotheses Findings
H1: The greater the influence of trade unions on an SDP,
Confirmed
the less the party will promise on antitrust policy
H2: The strongest the (potential) electoral threat on the left,
Mixed evidence
the less an SDP party will promise on antitrust policy
H3: The more coordinated a national political economy, the less the
Not confirmed
SDP will be able to credibly commit to more antitrust enforcement
Tab. 2: Summary of the main findings
Finally, as regards H3, the empirical analysis does not indicate any impact of the level of
coordination of an economy on the positioning of a SDP on antitrust policy. The eight
cases which inform our first two comparisons seem to show that “varieties of capitalism”
do not matter. One interpretation of this result may be that Europeanization and global-
ization fritter away system-wide peculiarities.
Four steps may be taken in order to further explore this topic and define a political econ-
omy of antitrust. The first is testing the hypotheses derived from a more precise model
with quantitative data. Particular attention should be devoted, in this case, to the oper-
ationalization of the dependent variable: how can ‘support for antitrust’ be measured in
a consistent away across time and countries? How should mentions and non-mentions
of antitrust policy be treated? Although such approaches have limitations, a time-series-
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cross-section dataset would have the advantage of letting us control for all possible ex-
planatory and intervening variable in a much more accurate way. The second step to take
involves analysing the evolution of SDPs’ attitude towards antitrust through time. We
know that SDPs have gradually come to embrace elements of (neo-)liberalism in their
programmes (see Buch-Hansen and Wigger, 2011, for an overview), but how this has
happened, and why it has happened earlier and more explicitly in some countries and not
in others is an issue worth exploring. Third, it would be important to also go beyond
manifestos, looking not only at what SDPs say, but also at what they do. Is the variation
we found in statements on anti-trust policy reflected in a different approach to compe-
tition legislation and enforcement? This is particularly interesting in the EU, where a
common antitrust policy ties the hands of national governments. Are SDPs different from
right-wing parties, and different from each other, when it comes to antitrust implemen-
tation? Finally, given that our research has highlighted the influence of trade unions on
social-democratic parties in Europe, we think that a political economy of antitrust would
strongly benefit from more specific knowledge of the attitudes of trade unions towards
antitrust policy. Do they consistently advocate more hands-on regulation, or do they also
support antitrust enforcement under certain conditions? These questions ultimately relate
to the relationship between the European labour movement, which was born and pros-
pered in the golden age of welfare state, and nowadays’ globalized capitalism, which
challenges the very existence of social democracy.
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